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AbstrAct
This article aims at establishing a dialogue between the theory 
of hegemony of Ernesto Laclau and the categorial interpretation of Marx by Moishe Postone. First, I will show that the 
hegemonic logic of Laclau appears logically constituted by the dynamic of capital as Postone studies it. Second, I will 
defend the relevance of the hegemonic conception of politics, no longer as an originary social ontology, but as a limited (yet 
partially effective) social logic characteristic of capitalist society.
Keywords: hegemony; capitalism; populism; Laclau; Postone.
A lógica do capital e a lógica hegemônica 
resumo
Este artigo estabelece um diálogo entre a teoria da hegemonia 
de Ernesto Laclau e a interpretação de Marx por Moishe Postone. Mostrarei, em primeiro lugar, que a lógica hegemônica de 
Laclau aparece constituída pela dinâmica do capital como estudado por Postone. Em seguida, defenderei a relevância 
da concepção hegemônica de política, não mais como uma ontologia social originária, mas como uma lógica social limitada 
(mas parcialmente eficaz) característica da sociedade capitalista.
PAlAvrAs‑chAve: hegemonia; capitalismo; populismo; Laclau; Postone.
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IntroductIon
In recent years, the critical engagement with Marx‑
ism has taken several different paths, among which I would like to 
highlight two. The works of Ernesto Laclau (especially Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, 1985, co‑written with Chantal Mouffe) have radical‑
ized the autonomy of the political, pointing out that the hegemonic 
articulations which make up the discursive space of the social as such 
are neither inscribed in, nor subordinated to, a preexisting economic 
structure. His concept of hegemony tries to reconstruct how political 
unity is formed from the starting point of the fragmented nature of the 
social, where an irreducible plurality of particular and partial demands 
is given. Once the strong idea of necessity of the traditional Marxism 
has been broken, the very idea of a political necessity determined by 
a social logic would also fall. There remains, thus, contingency as the 
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context for the emergence of variable political units which are always 
under dispute, organized each time by a hegemonic operation which 
enables a particular demand to transiently represent the social whole 
and build a significant chain that grounds society as such.
By way of contrast, the work of Moishe Postone places emphasis 
on the logic of capital in its compulsive and automatic character, 
therefore, independent of politics and of contingent decisions. Em‑
phasizing that certain types of necessity posited by capital consti‑
tute a historically determined and specifically modern form of social 
domination, Postone interprets the mature Marx in terms of how 
capitalist society is not, ultimately, governed politically. Postone under‑
stands that the necessary nature of the logic of capital, with its anon‑
ymous, objectified and impersonal compulsions, constitutes a form 
of domination that is historically unprecedented. The emancipatory 
ideals underlying Postone’s thought aim at broadening the horizon of 
politics beyond the compulsions and necessary dynamics imposed by capital‑
ism. The capitalist encroachment of politics is not, thus, celebrated by 
the author: it is not a matter of swimming with the current of histori‑
cal necessity, of continuing or deepening the inevitable course of a 
pre‑established logic that dictates the evolutionary stages of human 
history. On the contrary, Postone sides with poststructuralist criti‑
cisms of the strong concepts of totality inherited from Hegelianism 
in traditional Marxism: it is only under capitalist domination that 
there is social totality with a global subject. In fact, capital (and not 
the working class or humanity) appears as the subject of modern 
society, in so far as it reduces contingency and multiplicity to its 
self‑moving dynamics. However, according to Postone, poststruc‑
turalists conflate normative and descriptive dimensions: they mis‑
take the critique of totality as a form of domination for the assertion 
that social totality has collapsed or disintegrated. This illegitimate 
transition leads to the inability to identify the forms of domination 
actually suffered by people in capitalist society, where capital as a 
global subject replaces, to some extent, the contingent dynamics of 
politics. Postone, therefore, shares the criticism of traditional Marx‑
ism and its affirmative attitude towards strong notions of totality 
and historical necessity, but questions the poststructuralist turn to‑
wards the autonomy of politics because they simply render capital 
as a form of domination difficult to understand or identify. 
In short, I will focus on two critical engagements with Marxism 
that appear powerfully opposed. In the first case, the emphasis is 
placed on the autonomy of the political, the precariousness and the 
contingent character of every social order. In the second, it is placed 
on the social constraints imposed on people by capital’s imperson‑
al, anonymous and blind logic. It is noteworthy that no significant 
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contributions dealing with the relation between Postone and Laclau 
have been found. Most Marxist criticisms of the latter attempt some 
kind of “defense” strategy (Geras, 1987, p. 43), attempting to rescue 
strong aspects of traditional Marxism from the attacks of poststruc‑
turalism. Positions such as that of Norman Geras (1987, 1988), Ellen 
Meiksins Wood (1987) or Atilio Borón (1986) can be regarded as 
examples of this argumentative strategy, attempting to affirm the 
priority of the material over the discursive, to uphold the central‑
ity of class struggle, and to defend (even with nuances) a Marxist 
theory of history or a general Marxist theory about the priority of 
economics over politics and ideology.
In this article I will attempt an argumentative strategy different 
from the aforementioned “defense of Marxism”. I am going to under‑
take a dialogue between the post‑Marxism of Laclau and the catego‑
rial criticism of Postone, making a double movement. As a starting 
point I will assume that the hegemonic logic studied by Laclau can be 
considered, to some extent, as the effective logic of politics in modern 
society. However, following Postone, I will try to show that this effec‑
tiveness is both logically and historically limited: against the idea that 
society is based on contingent political operations, I will argue 
that the hegemonic logic as such is conditioned by capitalist dynam‑
ics. In other words, the multiplicity of floating demands in the social, 
which are a precondition for the hegemonic articulation, only appears 
as such in the modernity of capital, which pushes back the traditional 
forms of domination (based on ties of personal dependence or overt 
social mediations). This calls for a re‑inscription of the political logic 
reconstructed by Laclau into a preeminent capitalist social logic. Post‑
one’s thinking, with its emphasis on modern forms of social mediation, 
is better prepared to provide an account for the historical framework 
within which political contingency and hegemonic logic emerge, em‑
phasizing, at the same time, the moments of necessity imposed by that 
historical framework, which is inadequately analyzed by Laclau. Lastly, 
I will claim that post‑Marxism offers strategic value to elaborate on a 
political logic beyond the centrality of the working class. This amounts 
to an unattended coincidence between Postone and the post‑Marxists: 
in both cases we find revisions of Marxism which rejects the inherited 
idea of centrality of the working class. Postone considers that there is 
no immediate relation between the self‑constitution of the working 
class and the radical critique of capital. However, this author does not 
elaborate sufficiently on how the political forms and historical move‑
ments capable of challenging or questioning capitalism as such could 
be reconstructed. It is at this point that the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe 
become relevant, allowing the reconstruction of a hegemonic proj‑
ect for the left that renews the possibilities of anti‑capitalism. Some 
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political suggestions by Srnicek and Williams (2015) will prove rel‑
evant for this third argumentative movement, since they try to make 
use of the hegemonic logic to conceive anti‑capitalist political forms 
in a politically fragmented—yet undeniably capitalist—world. These 
readers of Laclau, with whom I will deal in detail in a later section of the 
text, make use of certain elements of his thinking without thoroughly 
assuming his contingencialist ontology.
The article involves three major movements. First, I will recon‑
struct Laclau’s notion of hegemony, trying to emphasize how the he‑
gemonic logic appears as part of a historically specific reality, related to 
the dynamics of capitalism, and not as the ontological foundation of 
every society. Second, I will argue that Postone’s categorial critique can 
adequately reconstruct the capitalist dynamic within which the hege‑
monic articulations become effective. Third, I will sustain (following 
Srnicek and Williams) that it is possible to revisit Laclau’s strategy, 
reformulated within a critical theory of capitalism, as a theoretical 
alternative able to partially account for the production of potentially 
successful political forms of unity in the modern world.
Hegemony: An ontologIc or modern logIc?
Laclau’s thinking starts from the demand as the basic unit of 
analysis of political logic. The author points to the proliferation 
of particular demands on the field of discourse as a starting point. 
This proliferation of multiple demands can, under certain circum‑
stances, be articulated in a hegemonic way, giving rise to a popular 
identity. The author highlights five moments in populist construc‑
tion (Laclau, 2005, pp. 69‑72): 1) The social (structured discursively 
or in relational terms) is composed of differential arrangements, of a 
plurality of particular positions that make up a system of differences 
where each of them is defined by the relations it maintains with the 
others. These differential positions make up a plurality of particular 
demands; 2) Apprehending the totality of this differential system 
is the same as apprehending its limits, counterpoising the whole 
to something other than the system itself. However, since it is the 
totality of the system of differences we are discussing, this limit‑
ing‑other can neither be a simple differential position within the 
system itself (because otherwise it would not fulfill the role of con‑
stitutive otherness), nor can it be completely exterior (for we are deal‑
ing with the totality of differential positions); 3) Then, the “outside” 
that constitutes the total system of differences must be an excluded 
element, which the whole expels in order to constitute itself. Faced 
with this excluded element, all the particular demands within the 
system are equivalent. The differences between them are not can‑
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celed or annulled, but all the particular positions are equally delimited 
from the other that makes the whole possible. The construction of 
a chain of equivalences, therefore, softens (without suppressing) 
the differences between demands, composing a popular identity in 
the tension between a differential logic and a logic of equivalence; 
4) Consequently, social totality is composed as an inherently pre‑
carious whole, built on the tension between two opposing logics 
(differential and equivalent). The construction of a totality is neces‑
sary in order to structure the discursive field of the social and, at the 
same time, it is inherently flawed (since it never suppresses the ten‑
sion between equivalence and difference); 5) Finally, this precarious 
whole is mounted on a peculiar type of representation. A particular 
demand, without ceasing to be such, assumes the representation of 
the whole, which, however, it never quite encompasses completely. 
This is how the hegemonic demand is constituted. In order to hege‑
monize the chain of equivalents, this demand becomes increasingly 
empty regarding its own content, constituting itself as an “empty 
signifier” representing the impossible‑necessary totality of the sys‑
tem of differential positions.
The five described steps organize, according to Laclau, the logic 
of the hegemonic construction of a popular identity. The demands 
which come to be metabolized deferentially by institutions are demo‑
cratic, while those which remain unsatisfied can enter into a chain of 
equivalences with other demands to become popular demands (Laclau, 
2005, p. 73). Populism presupposes, then: a) the construction of a 
frontier, a dichotomy between the people and “power” (Laclau, 2005, 
p. 74); b) the equivalence between a plurality of popular demands; c) 
the articulation of those demands based on a particular representa‑
tion of a totality that remains absent from society. The antagonistic 
division of the social involves the impossible image of a social whole, 
whose attainment would be equivalent to the state of affairs where all 
demands would be metabolized. The full totality of society, then, only 
exists as an impossibility, as the discursive obverse of the hegemonic 
position and the antagonistic fracture of the social.
Now, what is the historical specificity hegemonic politics have? 
The chain of equivalences, the antagonistic division of the social, the 
emergence of the empty signifier—all these elements are postulated 
by Laclau as conditions for the political institution of society as such. 
He affirms the ontological necessity to create antagonistic social opposi‑
tions through hegemonic operations, independently of the contingent 
particular that functions as empty signifier in each case (Laclau, 2005, 
p. 87). The ontological function of articulating the social through an‑
tagonism and hegemony is necessary, even though the content which 
promotes the articulation is contingent. The particular demand hege‑
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monizing the signifying chain in the populist operation would then 
be contingent, but not so the populist logic as such.
Yet, is the populist logic an ontological necessity for structur‑
ing the social as such? Or does the “populist ontology” have a lim‑
ited scope, being applicable only to capitalist society, for instance? 
In On Populist Reason (2005) Laclau tends to formalize his line of 
argument, linking the populist operation to the political as such and 
deriving it from his reading of Freud and Lacan (Laclau, 2005, pp. 
112‑5). In this context Laclau seems to derive the populist logic from 
the constitution of discourse or society as such. On the other hand, 
when he differentiates between popular and democratic demands 
(Laclau, 2005, pp. 73‑4), it appears as if Laclau attempts to specify 
populism as a contingent social possibility among others: the very 
articulation of equivalences‑antagonism‑hegemony might not oc‑
cur. But, in such case, would the ontological impossibility of a full 
society be canceled? Or would there be other ways of dealing with 
this impossibility (for example, in non‑populist democracies, in to‑
talitarian formats that crush particular demands, in non‑democratic 
hierarchical orders with minimal space for contingency)? In short, 
Laclausian social ontology seems to be extremely ambiguous with 
respect to historical specificity. While emphasizing the ontic and 
historical preconditions of his theory in Hegemony and socialist strat‑
egy (co‑written with Chantal Mouffe), he formalizes his argument a 
lot more in On Populist Reason. Overall, Laclau maintains a notorious 
ambiguity regarding the historical conditions for the production of 
empty signifiers and the hegemonic articulation.
Ultimately, Laclau seems to maintain that populism may or 
may not arise, but, at the same time, that it would explain in a more 
“transparent” manner the ontological conditions of every social ar‑
rangement. Apparently, populism does not have a radically different 
logic with respect to liberalism, fascism or socialism (Acha, 2013). 
In any case, its specificity lies in a greater “transparency” of the polit‑
ical logic: populism would neither veil nor blur, behind the contrap‑
tions of institutionalized norms, the antagonistic institution of the 
social. Populism would be simply more authentic or more honest 
with respect to the lack of foundations of the social, highlighting the 
precariousness of any discursive institution of collective life, where 
other political forms tend to disguise that precariousness. How‑
ever, the question remains whether the hegemonic logic, with its 
instances of articulation, is effectively an ontological condition of 
possibility of society as such, or a historically determined dynamic 
of some specific societies, alas, modern ones.
The historical conditions of Laclausian hegemony can be clari‑
fied a little more by analyzing the starting point in the proliferation 
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of particular demands. Where do the demands come from? Are there 
historical conditions for their emergence? In this plane, the marks 
of his torical specificity emerge sensitively. At least in the less for‑
malistic argument of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the prolifera‑
tion of social demands is inscribed in the “democratic revolution” 
as the original and specific phenomenon of modern societies. There 
are, apparently, historical preconditions for hegemonic politics. The 
medieval peasant community, for example, would be scarcely sus‑
ceptible to hegemonic articulations. Without denying his ontologi‑
cal presumption that the social cannot be totalized, Laclau affirms 
that premodern societies would be relatively more saturated than 
their modern counterparts. There would be no discursive possi‑
bilities for the proliferation of demands: the system of differences 
would be too rigid and hierarchical for it.
A situation in which a system of differences had been so welded togeth‑
er would imply the end of the hegemonic form of politics. In that case, there 
would be relations of subordination or power, but not, strictly speaking, 
hegemonic relations. The hegemonic dimension of politics only expands 
as the open, non‑sutured character of the social increases. In a medieval 
peasant community the area open to differential articulations is minimal 
and, thus, there are no hegemonic forms of articulation: there is an abrupt 
transition from repetitive practices within a closed system of differences to 
frontal and absolute equivalences when the community finds itself threat‑
ened. This is why the hegemonic form of politics only becomes dominant 
at the beginning of modern times, when the reproduction of the differ‑
ent social areas takes place in permanently changing conditions which 
constantly require the construction of new systems of differences. Hence 
the area of articulatory practices is immensely broadened. (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001, p. 138)
If “plurality is not the phenomenon to be explained, but the start‑
ing point of the analysis” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 140), however, 
it seems that the plurality of differential demands is in itself a historical 
product. Following Lefort (1990), the French Revolution would mark 
“the decisive mutation in the political imaginary of Western societies” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 155). The proliferation of differential 
demands is inscribed on the spread of the “democratic discourse”. 
The democratic revolution is the “framework” for the logic of demo‑
cratic displacements that enable hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 
p. 168). By overcoming the “saturated” social articulations of medieval 
societies, this democratic transformation of society may have been the 
decisive mutation that gave way to the plurality of subject positions 
that are at the base of all hegemonic logic.
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The “democratic revolution” involves a new terrain which supposes a 
profound mutation at the symbolic level, implies a new form of institution of 
the social . In earlier societies, organized in accordance with a theological‑po‑
litical logic, power was incorporated in the person of the prince, who was the 
representative of God — that is to say, of sovereign justice and sovereign rea‑
son. Society was thought as a body, the hierarchy of whose members rested 
upon the principle of unconditional order. According to Lefort, the radical 
difference which democratic society introduces is that the site of power be‑
comes an empty space; the reference to a transcendent guarantor disappears, 
and with it the representation of the substantial unity of society. (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2001, p. 186)
At the origin of specifically modern politics there would be a void 
in the sovereign instance (the sovereign people is not embodied by a 
particular individual). This opens an endless process of questioning 
where society can no longer be fixed and controlled by a single center. 
In sum, the plurality of demands in a differential system, which ap‑
pears as a starting point in the analysis of Laclau, is ultimately recog‑
nized as a historical result: only modern politics, which has undergone 
the radical transformation of the democratic revolution, facilitates the 
proliferation of demands.
From the standpoint of the articulation between ontology and 
history, the scope of the populist logic seems to be relatively ambig‑
uous and difficult to define. On one hand, hegemony is construed as 
an ontologic condition of every society. On the other hand, when we 
study the proliferation of particular demands, the marks of histori‑
cal specificity in the Laclausian thought are poignant. The plurality 
of demands, starting point of the analysis, is recognized as a histori‑
cal result. The egalitarian and democratic “framework” that makes 
the plurality of demands possible is a historical condition of the 
hegemonic articulation, to the point that in pre‑modern societies 
such articulation would not take place. Inquiring into the “mystery 
of the origin of demand” (Waiman, 2013, p. 288) it can be shown 
that hegemonic politics as such is linked to the logic of capital in its 
historical specificity.
Postone’s cAtegorIAl reAdIng of mArx
Omar Acha (2013) has pointed out that Laclau’s reading of Marx is 
somewhat biased, focusing almost exclusively on a debatable reading 
of the 1859 “Introduction” and the Communist Manifesto, identifying 
“Marxism” with a teleological philosophy of history, a reductionist 
conception of class struggle and a totalizing metaphysics of the sub‑
ject. In other words, Laclau reduces the Marxist tradition to what Post‑
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one calls “traditional Marxism”. Waiman (2013) also highlights the 
“convenient” omission of traditions such as the Critical Theory of the 
Frankfurt School in the Laclausian reception of Marxism. Following 
Postone, I will claim it is possible to construct a different reading of 
Marx, one that could not only hold up to the post‑Marxist question‑
ing but also provide an adequate reading on the historical framework 
in which the hegemonic logic takes effect. This reading does not as‑
sume the standpoint of labor understood transhistorically, it does not 
presuppose a philosophy of universal history and does not aspire to 
realize a totality as the end of history. Instead, it places emphasis on 
the mutations in the forms of social mediation produced by capital‑
ist society in its historical specificity, analyzes the contradictions be‑
tween the oppressive logic of capital and its emancipatory potentials, 
and aims at the abolition of the capitalist social totality.
Following Postone, Marx’s theory of labor value “is not a theory 
of the unique properties of labor in general, but it is an analysis of the 
historical specificity of value as a form of wealth, and of the labor that 
supposedly constitutes it” (Postone, 1993, p. 26). Value and the partic‑
ular form of labor creating it are at the heart of the fetishist structures 
that structure domination in capitalism. “Capitalism’s characteristic 
form of social domination, according to Marx, relates to the form of 
social labor” (Ibid., p. 125). Three fundamental historical forms are 
thus considered: 1) In societies based on personal dependence, with 
“overt” social relations, people suffer from manifest subordination to 
other people; 2) In the capitalist society, social domination is given in 
terms of “personal independence, within a framework of a system of 
objective dependence” (Ibid.). In this society, the relations between 
people exist in a specific, particular way: they have become something 
quasi‑objective and autonomous with respect to individuals. They 
are not overt relations between persons (as were, for example, feudal 
relations). On the contrary, they are quasi‑objective structures that 
dominate individuals insofar as they possess an intrinsic dynamic in‑
dependent of them. Individuals are now “dominated by abstractions” 
(Marx, 1971, p. 92), instead of immediately dominating one another; 
3) Finally, post‑capitalism, linked to the “fullest possible realization 
of human freedom” (Postone, 1993, p. 127), would imply overcoming 
both pre‑capitalist forms of overt domination and the structures of 
abstract capitalist domination.
The abstract and quasi‑objective structures constituting social 
domination in modernity are related to the capitalist form of social 
mediation. “We are dealing with a new sort of interdependence, one 
that emerged historically in a slow, spontaneous and contingent 
way” (Ibid., p. 148). In this new form of social interdependence, 
individuals do not get the things they need to live from overt social 
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relations with other individuals, but rather their own labor — directly 
or expressed in its products — serves as an “objective” means by which 
the products of others are acquired (Ibid., p. 150). Value, capital and 
labor (divided in concrete and abstract) are not mediated by direct per‑
sonal relations, “recognizable” as such, but by a series of impersonal 
structures that they themselves constitute.
Postone breaks with any teleological vision of universal history. 
He does not assume the standpoint of a global historical subject that 
would traverse a number of developing stages in an ascending and 
necessary dynamic. There was no logical necessity in the transition to 
capitalism: such an image of necessity is, in any case, a retrospective 
projection (Ibid., p. 129). Instead, the author conceives capitalist so‑
ciety as a historically determined totality. The historical origin of this 
totality is contingent and spontaneous, based on politically directed 
processes. However, once the forms of social interdependence that 
characterize capitalism have been established, they possess an alien‑
ated, automatic and self‑mediating character. Value‑creating labor re‑
places personal, open and direct social relations with new fetishistic, 
quasi‑objective and abstract ones. These new historically determined 
social relations have an autonomous dynamic with respect to indi‑
viduals, a dynamic based on the self‑mediation of labor and value. As 
a result of a contingent historical process, a global subject of society 
emerges, which is self‑mediating and conducts its own development. 
Marx’s mature theory does not presuppose a philosophy of universal 
history and “cannot be grasped adequately as an essentially eschato‑
logical conception in a secular form” (Ibid., p. 79). Instead, it is a his‑
torically determined critique of capital.
Capitalist social relations conform a totality as long as their move‑
ment is independent from individuals:
The social form is a totality because it is not a collection of various partic‑
ularities but, rather, is constituted by a general and homogeneous “substance” 
that is its own ground. Since the totality is self‑grounding, self‑mediating 
and objectified, it exists quasi‑independently […]. Capitalism, as analyzed 
by Marx, is a form of social life with metaphysical attributes — those of the 
absolute Subject. (Ibid., p. 156)
With the passage from a form of social mediation based on person‑
al relations of direct dependence to a form of mediation centered on 
abstract, impersonal and objective compulsions, capitalism unfolds a 
dual process. On the one hand, it increasingly emancipates particular 
groups and individuals from personal bonds with authority, tradition 
and community. The modern “free, self‑determining individual”, op‑
posed to objective social necessity, is “historically constituted with 
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the rise and spread of the commodity‑determined form of social rela‑
tions” (Ibid., p. 164). Modern freedom and equality are made pos‑
sible by the capitalist mutation of social mediation. By supplanting 
traditional ties, capitalism constitutes the modern individual, with 
the unprecedented freedom this implies. From this historical shift 
derives the tendency in capitalism to turn the social more dynamic 
and plural, multiply the points of conflict, enable a new democratic 
ideology and radicalize it permanently. On the other hand, and con‑
tradictorily, capitalist society tends to an unprecedented homogene‑
ity: being the first society in history to have a dynamic and logic of 
totality, it subsumes the newly constituted “independent” particulars 
under a global and self‑moving subject, systematically encroaching 
the created potential for freedom and self‑determination. Capitalism, 
in short, is not a narrowly economic phenomenon that must be related 
a posteriori with a political, legal or ideological superstructure. On the 
contrary, it is based on a mutation of social forms of mediation, one 
which simultaneously tends to pluralize and homogenize social life, 
multiplying the possibilities of autonomy for the particulars and, at 
the same time, submitting everything to the self‑mediating move‑
ment of its blind and fetishized global subject, capital. This dual face 
of capitalism explains, notwithstanding, its complex relation with the 
“democratic revolution”, which it simultaneously enables and limits.
The historical appearance of the capitalist particular has a dual 
meaning and value. Capitalism generates the opposition between an 
abstract, homogeneous universality and a self‑determining individu‑
al, on the other (Ibid., p. 366). The characteristic universals of moder‑
nity, related to the general and abstract presumption of equality and 
freedom of individuals, can then be related to the historically situated 
critique of capital.
cAPItAlIsm, democrAtIc struggles, totAlIzed domInAtIon
Postone’s theses have enormous implications for the deployment 
of a Marxist theory of new social antagonisms and the correlative 
multiplication of demands and subject positions. Understanding the 
capitalist transformation of social mediation allows us to account for 
the new forms of subjectivity (and conflict) that emerge with it. The 
“democratic revolution” and the proliferation of demands and sub‑
ject positions, thus, can be inscribed in the historical capitalist trans‑
formation of social mediation. The core features of the democratic 
revolution are the displacement of incarnated centers of power and 
the emergence of the empty and thus open, dynamic popular sover‑
eignty, which does not have a corporeal and determined center. From 
Postone’s analysis, this “revolution” can be linked to the replacement 
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of open personal forms of mediation by the abstract and objectified 
forms of the commodity, value and labor. The democratic revolution 
itself, therefore, would not be an ontological condition of the social, 
but a milestone in the vast process of transformation of social media‑
tions that occurs with capitalism.
This enables the development of a Marxist theory of new social 
movements, which would show: 1) that they are made possible under 
the historical transformations of social mediation that take place in capi‑
talism; 2) that, in their struggles for individual and collective autonomy, 
they are systematically constrained by this new social mediation and 
have, therefore, emancipatory potentials. This dual process is related to 
the abstract, objective and impersonal character of social mediation in 
capitalist modernity. By displacing personal patterns of dependence, the 
capitalist form of mediation enables an unprecedented pluralization of 
the living trajectories of individuals and groups. This historical muta‑
tion is at the base of the multiplication of demands and subject posi‑
tions. Similarly, once forms of personal domination are no longer the 
core of social mediation, the “place” of power can become empty: it no 
longer resides in the person of the lord or prince, but in an impersonal, 
anonymous and abstract system of quasi‑objective social constraints. In 
short, the “democratic revolution” that empties the space of sovereignty 
and enables the proliferation of demands can be put into a structural and 
systematic relation with the capitalist transformation of social media‑
tion. This is not, therefore, an originary datum, but it is embedded in‑
stead in the broader historical process of capital.
The democratic disputes studied by Laclau have a complex and 
contradictory relation with the capitalist mutation of social media‑
tion, while containing powerful possibilities for its overcoming. 
Capital, as argued above, effectively composes a social totality. “In 
constituting a self‑grounding social mediation, labor constitutes 
a determinate sort of all social whole — a totality” (Ibid., p. 151). 
The form of social mediation based on labor has the logical and dy‑
namic characteristics of a self‑moving subject and substance. With 
social relations mediated by labor, a historically specific subject of 
social totality emerges. “The social form is a totality because it is 
not a collection of various particularities but, rather, is constituted 
by a general and homogeneous ‘substance’ that is its own ground” 
(Ibid., p. 156). With the passage to capitalism, direct and open forms 
of personal domination recede, but this does not give way to in‑
dividual and collective autonomy. Instead, an impersonal system 
of anonymous social compulsions now constitutes social domina‑
tion. This means that, if the “democratic revolution” can be linked to 
the capitalist mutation of social mediation, it is also systematically 
constrained by it: capital as the subject of the social totality is, in its 
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automatic movement, radically non‑political, blind and uncontrol‑
lable by people, that is, anti‑democratic. Hence, “the problem of a 
post‑capitalist democracy” must be posed in terms of “the nature 
of the constraints imposed upon political decisions by the forms 
of value and capital” (Ibid., p. 41). Capital displaces direct personal 
domination, but not to enable a radical social democratization. In‑
stead, it makes possible only a limited and contradictory democ‑
ratization, subject to the self‑mediating totality of value and labor.
In short, Postone’s reading of Marx allows us to situate in histori‑
cally accurate terms some processes that appear ambiguous in Laclau’s 
thought. Postone shows how the forms of the social nexus mutate in 
capitalism, giving rise to a partial pluralization of collective life within 
which the multiplicity of demands assumed as a starting point by Laclau 
appears. The hegemonic logic does not produce the social nor is it prior 
to the objectified dynamics of capital. It is a derived logic, framed within 
the capitalist forms of social mediation. These forms also carry some 
specific constraints to democratic possibilities aiming towards political 
openness and social contingency. If capital makes the hegemonic logic 
possible, it also imposes the compulsion to accumulate, which arises as a 
necessity above the heads of individuals and their contingent struggles. 
Hegemonic politics, then, articulate collective subjects and particular 
demands, but do so within a framework of limited contingency (con‑
strained by capitalism and its compulsions). This way, the Postonian 
interpretation allows us: 1) to place the proliferation of demands that 
Laclau takes for granted in a more precise historical context (within the 
framework of capitalist logic); 2) to show that this historical framework 
is not neutral or merely formal, but that it constrains the possibilities 
of politics and contingency, subordinating them to the automatism of 
capital. From this it follows, finally, that the idea of political contingency 
is primarily an emancipatory ideal for a post‑capitalist democracy, and is 
only achieved in a limited and distorted way in capitalist society.
emAncIPAtory PolItIcs beyond tHe workIng clAss
In the previous section I attempted to reinscribe the hegemonic 
logic in the logic of capital. However, it is possible to give yet another 
twist to the argument. Indeed, both Laclau and Postone claim that 
present social struggles cannot be reduced to a class perspective un‑
derstood in a limited way. I will argue that, following the reinscription 
suggested above, Laclau’s thesis may be relevant to provide a strategic 
perspective to Postone’s analysis. For this I will study some of the ideas 
introduced by Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams.
According to Postone, capitalism is defined in terms of social rela‑
tions that cannot be exhaustively defined in terms of class:
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My discussion clearly has shown that his [Marx’s] conception of capi‑
talism’s intrinsically dynamic social relations, as expressed by the catego‑
ries of value and surplus value, refer to objectified forms of social mediation 
and cannot be understood solely in terms of class relations of exploitation. 
(Ibid., p. 314)
Therefore, the proletariat would not be “the social representative of 
a possible noncapitalist future” (Ibid., p. 355). Proletarian labor is the 
basis of value, but not necessarily of the social forms that could tran‑
scend capitalism. On the contrary, the abolition of proletarian labor 
and that of capitalism go hand in hand. Moreover, the forms of con‑
science and oppositional action against capitalism need not arise from 
the working class alone, but from a multiplicity of movements whose 
actions focus on subjectivity, the relation with the environment, the 
aspiration to a life not subject to the needs of valorization, etc. “There 
is no linear continuum between the demands and conceptions of the 
working class […] and the needs, demands and conceptions that point 
beyond capitalism” (Ibid., p. 37).
Postone reinterprets Marx’s critical theory by trying to give central‑
ity to issues such as subjectivity, social mediation and political aspira‑
tions to forms of social activity that would be richer and more open 
and multilateral. These forms of action and critical consciousness are 
reflected in a plethora of social movements not necessarily focused 
on labor and wages. Far from affirming the standpoint of the prole‑
tariat as an exploited class, Postone’s critical theory seeks to abolish 
proletarian labor as a fundamental category of modern society, with 
its forms of social interdependence and its characteristic constraints.
According to Srnicek and Williams, Laclau’s concept of hegemony 
makes it possible to explain “why ordinary people were not revolt‑
ing against capitalism” (Srnicek and Williams, 2015, p. 132), but also 
to construct strategic perspectives for challenging given social condi‑
tions. Capitalist development did not lead to a polarized world between 
the two antagonistic (and internally homogeneous) positions of the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. “By the 1990s, the positioning of the 
working class as privileged political subject had been fully broken down, 
and a much wider array of social identities, desires and oppressions 
had gained recognition” (Ibid., p. 21). While the division of society in 
classes remains a relevant and even central aspect of the organization of 
capitalist society, effective actors in their daily struggles are not divided 
into two large excluding groups constituted by the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. Against the forecasts of traditional Marxism, there was no 
historical spontaneous unification of the working class (and other social 
movements) by the unfolding of capitalism itself, but a growing frag‑
mentation of social demands.
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At the same time, there is a multiplicity of important social conflicts 
that are sometimes ignored or regarded as secondary by traditional 
Marxism, as is the case of feminist, lgbt, anti‑racist, anti‑colonial, envi‑
ronmentalist, among other struggles. Against this tendency, a left‑wing 
project with possibilities of success, but also genuinely emancipatory, 
must be “inherently feminist, recognizing the invisible labor carried 
out predominantly by women”, linking with “anti‑racist struggles” and 
“with postcolonial and indigenous struggles” (Ibid., p. 161). Today, the 
project of the left must maintain an open, complex and pluralistic agen‑
da that is attentive to a diversity that is not easily reduced to a narrow set 
of interests, aspirations and demands.
According to Srnicek and Williams, “there is no pre‑existing group 
that would embody universal interests or constitute the necessary 
vanguard of this transformative project” (Ibid., p. 158). The unity of 
various groups, on the contrary, must be conquered politically, and 
their representatives and forms of agglutination will be decided on 
the contingencies of struggle. Hence Srnicek and Williams recur to 
Laclau’s concept of hegemony as a political logic capable of articulat‑
ing different demands where unity is not immediately produced at the 
level of objective social dynamics.
Taking the ideas of Srnicek and Williams into account, it is pos‑
sible to return to the theses of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. In their 
long genealogy of the concept of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe argue 
that political unity is always produced by way of articulation from dif‑
ferent demands. This means that political articulations are contingent 
and transient. Studying Sorel, the authors claim: “The possibility of a 
dichotomous division of society is not given as data of the social struc‑
ture, but as a construction” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 40). Here 
emerges a problem faced by the Marxist tradition “whenever it has 
tried to break with economism” (Ibid., p. 41), the problem of the con‑
tingent construction of political unity. The authors ask: “Why should 
this politically or mythically reconstructed subject have to be a class 
subject?” (Ibid., emphasis on the original). The concept of hegemony 
arises, in the Marxist tradition itself, from the need to deal with forms 
of antagonism that are not always structured in terms of class, but also 
from the attempts to bring all those antagonisms back to the arena of 
class struggle.
Communist discourse was confronted by a pair of crucial problems. 
How should one characterize that plurality of antagonisms emerging on a 
mass terrain different from that of classes? And how could the hegemonic 
force retain a strictly proletarian character, once it had incorporated the 
democratic demands of the masses in its own identity? (Ibid., p. 62)
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In summary: the hegemonic logic allows us to think about how 
political syntheses are produced where the dynamics of capital or of 
class struggle do not automatically generate the unity of all demands 
under the direction of the working class. Thus, the political units that 
propel changes have a contingent and artificial character, one that is 
not determined immediately by a previously given social logic. Political unity 
“is not the confirmation of a de facto situation, but has a performative 
character. The unity of an ensemble of sectors is not a datum: it is a 
project to be built politically” (Ibid., p. 63). Laclau and Mouffe try to 
analyze how political units are produced where the centrality of the 
class cannot be taken for granted.
In this reinterpretation, what is central to Laclau and Mouffe’s thinking 
is not the contingencialist ontology of the social (which I have discussed 
at length in the previous sections of this work), but the reconstruction of 
how political struggles take place in the modernity of capital. According 
to this reconstruction, the proletariat cannot be considered in advance as 
the privileged agent of social change, at least not in the terms inherited 
from traditional Marxism. This allows us to return to Laclau through the 
re‑inscription operation carried out above and leads to a singular, and little 
studied, coincidence with Postone’s thought. Earlier in the text I tried to 
show that the plurality of demands and the hegemonic logic is not a tran‑
shistorical condition of social ontology in general but a specific feature of 
capitalist modernity. I also argued that capitalism, while making the hege‑
monic logic possible, constrains its possibilities insofar as it imposes its 
necessary and automatic dynamics, constituted by value and labor. In this 
section, however, I tried to show (following Srnicek and Williams) that the 
hegemonic logic, understood (through the necessary operation of re‑in‑
scription) as a specific logic of modern society, is relevant in order to give an 
account of how political conflicts and actual emancipatory struggles work. 
This means that, by re‑inscribing hegemony in the critique of capital, the 
concept itself is not discarded or canceled, but rather placed under precise 
historical conditions which also mark the scope of its effectiveness.
concludIng consIderAtIons
This article involved three major conceptual movements. In the first 
section I tried to show that there is an ambiguity, an unresolved ten‑
sion, around the historical specificity of the hegemonic logic in Laclau’s 
thought. The author postulates hegemony as the core condition for the 
constitution of the social as such. The contingent operations which pro‑
duce unity from the multiplicity of demands would then produce soci‑
ety as such. However, in some of his passages I found the idea that the 
hegemonic articulation would in itself be contingent, emerging after 
the modern “democratic revolution”. In the second section I reconstructed 
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Postone’s categorial reading of Marx, trying to show that the hegemonic 
logic can be reinscribed as a moment of the logic of capital. Only under 
capitalism, which pluralizes social mediation by displacing forms of per‑
sonal domination and subjecting them to the objectified, anonymous 
and abstract compulsions of value and capital, does the multiplicity of 
demands appear in their modern form. At the same time, capitalist social 
dynamics systematically constrain the possibilities of politics, circum‑
scribing them within the frame of a blind, necessary logic. This means 
that openness to contingency is an emancipatory ideal for a postcapital‑
ist society rather than a given fact of capitalist reality. Finally, I returned to 
the concept of hegemony as a powerful tool to analyze the possibilities of 
emancipatory politics in modernity, following the reinscription opera‑
tion of the previous sections. Understood as a political logic that emerg‑
es under specific historical conditions of capitalism, and no longer as a 
foundational ontological dynamic of every society, hegemony is revealed 
as a powerful concept to understand the creation of political units in a 
context of dispersion and fragmentation of subjects and demands.
With these three movements I tried to relate the thoughts of Post‑
one and Laclau. This relational account is relevant because there is no 
significant research on the (limited) similarities between the two au‑
thors, despite the important connections clarified in this work. The di‑
alogue between Moishe Postone and Ernesto Laclau makes it possible 
to situate with precision the effectiveness of the hegemonic logic, its 
scope and its potentialities within the framework of capitalist society.
Facundo Nahuel Martín [http://orcid.org/0000‑0002‑2832‑3333] holds a PhD in Philoso‑
phy from Universidad de Buenos Aires and is postdoctoral fellow at Conicet (Argentina).
references
Acha, O. “Del populismo marxista al postmarxista: la trayectoria de Ernesto Laclau en la Izquierda Nacional 
(1963‑2013)”. Archivos de Historia del Movimiento Obrero y la Izquierda, n. 3, 2013, pp. 50‑63.
Borón, A. “¿Post‑marxismo? Crisis, recomposición o liquidación del marxismo en la obra de Ernesto Laclau”. 
Revista Mexicana de Sociología, v. 58, n. 1, 1996, pp. 17‑42.
Geras, N. “Post‑Marxism?”. New Left Review, London, n. 163, 1987, pp. 40‑82.
 . “Ex‑Marxism without Substance: Being a Real Reply to Laclau and Mouffe”. New Left Review, London, 
n. 169, 1988, pp. 34‑61.
Laclau, E. Emancipación y diferencia. Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1996.
 . On Populist Reason. London/New York: Verso, 2005.
Laclau, E.; Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London/New York: Verso 2001.
Lefort, C. La invención democrática. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión, 1990.
Marx, K. Elementos fundamentales para la crítica de la economía política. Borrador 1857‑1858. Buenos Aires: Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, 1971.
Meiksins Wood, E. The Retreat from Class. A New “True” Socialism. London: Verso, 1986.
Postone, M. Time, Labor and Social Domination. A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993.
 . “History and Helplessness”. Public Culture, 18, v. 1, 2006, pp. 93‑110.
 . History and Heteronomy. Critical Essays. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009.
Srnicek, N.; Williams, A. Inventing the Future. Postcapitalism and a World without Work. London: Verso, 2015.
Waiman, J. “Dialéctica y ontología: repensando el antagonismo post‑marxista en la teoría crítica”. Constelaciones. 
Revista de Teoría Crítica, n. 5, 2013, pp. 280‑310.
Received for publication  
on February 6, 2018.
Approved for publication  





10_martin_114_p458a475.indd   475 9/4/19   3:48 PM
